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Expansion of the "Automobile Exception"
to the Warrant Requirement: Police
Discretion Replaces the "Neutral
and Detached Magistrate"
California v. Acevedo1
As illegal drug usage continues to be an increasing concern of this
country, the United States Supreme Court has lessened Fourth Amendment
constraints on law enforcement officials.2 Because of the nature of drugs
(minute amounts are illegal and thus they are easily transported and hidden),
the allowable scope of searches is a critical issue in the "war on drugs."
Regardless of whether the Court had drugs in mind when it set forth this new
rule,3 it is drug related offenses where this decision will have the visible
impact.4
1. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
2. Recent examples of the Court's lessening of Fourth Amendment restrictions
include Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2385-87 (1991) (police search "sweeps"
of buses is not per se unconstitutional; dissent accuses Court of suspending Fourth
Amendment protections to fight "war on drugs" (Marshall, J., dissenting)); Florida v.
Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1805-06 (1991) (consent searches of automobiles may be
extended to closed containers under "objective test;" cocaine found inside paper bag
at issue in the case); California v. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549-52 (1991) (Fourth
Amendment "seizure" of person redefined more narrowly; crack cocaine discarded
prior to seizure at issue in the case); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2795-96
(1990) (reasonable, but mistaken, officer evaluation of third party consent to search is
now not a violation of Fourth Amendment; drugs found during search at issue in the
case); Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1638-39 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Apparently the mere possibility of a minor burden on law enforcement interests is
enough to generate corrective action by this Court.") Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
456-57 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is indeed easy to forget, especially in view
of current concern over drug trafficking, that the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
protection does not turn on whether the activity disclosed by a search is illegal or
innocuous.")
3. The Court made no references to illegal drugs in discussing the policy behind
its holding. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1988-91.
4. In the eight cases that have applied the rule set forth in Acevedo, seven have
involved a search exposing illegal drugs or, in one case, chemicals used to manufacture
illegal drugs. United States v. Celio, 945 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (heroin); United
States v. Sanchez, 944 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1991) (cocaine); United States v. Rojo-
Alvarez, 944 F.2d 959 (1st Cir. 1991) (cocaine); United States v. Cook, 938 F.2d 149
(9th Cir. 1991) (chemicals used to manufacture drugs); People v. Rodrigues-Fernandez,
1
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I. THE FACTS
In October 1987, a federal drug enforcement agent in Hawaii seized a
Federal Express package containing nine clear bags of marijuana.5 The
package was addressed to J.R. Daza of Santa Ana, California.6 On October
28, 1987, the federal agent contacted Officer Coleman of the Santa Ana Police
Department and arranged for the package to be sent to Coleman.7 Coleman
was to take the package to the local Federal Express office and arrest the
package's claimant.
8
On October 29, Coleman received the package and delivered it to the
Federal Express office.9 The next day, at approximately 10:30 a.m., a man
identifying himself as Jamie Daza claimed the package, drove to his
apartment, and took the package inside.'0 Police officers followed Daza to
his apartment.' At 11:45 a.m., Daza left his apartment and put the box and
paper from the package in the trash.'2 Officer Coleman then left to obtain
a search warrant. 3
At 12:30 p.m., Charles Steven Acevedo went into the apartment.
14
After about 10 minutes, Acevedo left the apartment carrying a brown paper
bag that appeared to be full.'5 The officers noticed that the bag was the
same size as one of the clear bags within the package picked up by Daza. 16
Acevedo walked to a car, placed the bag in the trunk, and started to drive
286 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (cocaine); State v. Search, 472 N.W.2d 850
(Minn. 1991) (stolen electronics); State v. Lugo, 592 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. 1991)
(heroin).
5. People v. Acevedo, 365 Cal. Rpt. 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, California v.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
6. Id.




11. Acevedo, 265 Cal. Rpt. at 25.
12. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1984.
13. Id.
14. Id. Prior to this, at 12:05 a.m., Richard St. George left the apartment with a
knapsack that appeared to be half full. Id. St. George was stopped as he drove off,
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away. 17 The officers stopped the car, opened the trunk and searched the
bag.' 8 The bag contained marijuana.19
Acevedo was charged in a California superior court with possession of
marijuana for sale.2" He moved to suppress admission of the marijuana
found in the trunk.2' The motion was denied and Acevedo appealed.2 The
California Court of Appeal, after concluding that a warrant was necessary to
open the bag, ruled that the marijuana should have been suppressed23 The
Supreme Court of California denied petition for review.24 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.25
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded after holding that a warrant
is not necessary to search a container located in an automobile when an officer
has probable cause to believe that container holds contraband or evidence.'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the Place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.27
The Supreme Court has held "that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment
requires adherence to judicial processes. ''2s Therefore, "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
17. Id. at 1984-85.
18. Id. at 1985.
19. Id.
20. Possession of marijuana for sale is in violation of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11359 (West 1987).
21. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1985.
22. Id. Acevedo plead guilty after his suppression motion was denied prior to
appealing the denial. Id.
23. Acevedo, 265 Cal. Rpt. at 28.
24. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1985.
25. Id. at 1985.
26. Id. at 1991.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (quoting United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S 48, 51 (1951)).
1992]
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specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."29 In 1925, the Court
created such an exception with its ruling in Carroll v. United States."
In Carroll, federal prohibition agents had probable cause to believe
defendants George Carroll and John Kiro were transporting contraband in their
automobile." The agents stopped and searched the automobile on a public
highway.32  The search revealed contraband.33  Defendants were indicted
for transporting the contraband.3 ' Defendants moved for the return of the
contraband to Carroll, the owner of the automobile. 35 The motion was
denied, and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.36
The Carroll Court noted that the First, Second, and Fourth Congresses
had created differentiated warrant requirements based on whether the search
was of a dwelling or of a movable vessel.37  The Court interpreted the
distinctions, enacted contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, as evidence that no warrant requirement exists for automobiles
under the Fourth Amendment. 38 The justification for the distinction rested
on the premise that vehicles, unlike dwellings and other structures, are
inherently movable objects and would consequently have the ability to avoid
search simply by relocating in another jurisdiction.39  The Court thus
concluded that the "right to search and the validity of the seizure ... are
[solely] dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief
that the contents of the automobile offend against the law."40
Forty-five years later, in Chambers v. Maroney,1 the Court enlarged the
realm of constitutional warrantless automobile searches by ruling that the
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnotes omitted). This language has been
consistently reaffirmed by the Court in it's Fourth Amendment cases. See Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous court);
see alsoAcevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991, 1994; Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20
(1984) (per curium).
30. 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1924).
31. Id. at 136. Prior to the day of the search, the agents had encountered the
defendants numerous times while investigating possible violations of the National
Prohibition Act. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The contraband was sixty-eight bottles of liquor found behind the
upholstering of the automobile seat. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 134.
36. Id. at 133.
37. Id. at 151.
38. Id. at 151-53.
39. Id. at 153.
40. Id. at 158-59.
41. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
[Vol. 57
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reasoning of Carroll was applicable when the automobile is searched at a
police station." In Chambers, police officers had probable cause to arrest
four occupants of an automobile they had stopped.43 The police had
probable cause to search the automobile,44 but did not search it at the time
of the arrests. 45 After the car was driven to the police station, a thorough
search revealed incriminating evidence that was later used to convict one of
the car's occupants. 46
Writing for the Court, Justice White reaffirmed the rationale of Carroll,
stating that the exigency created by the inherent movability of automobiles
justifies an immediate warrantless search.47 Justice White then asserted that
when probable cause exists, the seizure of an automobile until a warrant is
obtained is constitutional under Carroll.48 This led to the conclusion that the
warrantless station house search in this case was constitutional. 49 The Court
apparently based this conclusion on the assumption that the mobility of the car
was unaffected by its presence at the police station, therefore the Carroll
exigency rationale was still applicable.50
In the term following Chambers, the Court, in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,5' established that the Chambers temporal extension applied only
if Carroll would have justified an immediate warrantless search. 2 In
Coolidge, the police arrested defendant Edward Coolidge at his home, towed
his car from his driveway to the police station, and conducted a warrantless
search of the car.53 The search produced evidence used to convict Coo-
lidge.5 ' The defendant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court based
42. Id. at 52.
43. Id. at 46. The police were investigating a robbery that had occurred in the
vicinity. Id. Probable cause was based on the description of the car and the occupants
given to police by witnesses of the robbery. Id.
44. Id. at 47-48.
45. Id. at 44.
46. Id. at 44-45. The occupant was Frank Chambers. Id. Chambers did not
directly appeal the conviction, but contested the legality of search and seizure through
a federal Habeas Corpus motion filed from state prison. Id. at 45-46.
47. Id. at 51.
48. Id. at 52.
49. Id. at 51-52.
50. Id. at 52. The Court used the language: "The probable-cause factor still
obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth
Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone
until a warrant is secured." Id.
51. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
52. Id. at 463.
53. Id. at 447-48.
54. Id. at 448.
1992]
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on the failure of the trial court to suppress the evidence discovered in the
search of his car.55
The Court ruled that the exigency rationale justifying a Carroll search did
not support an immediate search of the defendant's car5 6 There was "no
alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway
after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no
confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a
special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile."5' The Court held
that because an immediate search would have been unconstitutional, the
Chambers extension was not applicable. Hence, the rule to arise from
Chambers became: "[I]f the police have probable cause to justify a warrant-
less seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct either
an immediate or a delayed search of the vehicle.
5 8
With the exigency rationale for the automobile warrant exception firmly
established in Carroll and Chambers, and refined by Coolidge, the Court
began to shape a second rationale for automobile searches. Beginning with
Cardwell v. Lewis, 59 the Court reasoned that the exception is also justified
because of a lower expectation of privacy in automobiles.6 In Cardwell, as
in Coolidge, the police arrested the defendant and impounded his car."1
Unlike Coolidge, the car was towed from a public lot.62 The "search" by the
police was limited to the exterior of the car. 63
Justice Blackmun, writing for a four Justice plurality, established the
second rationale by simply concluding that "[o]ne has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom
55. Id.
56. Id. at 462.
57. Id.
58. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1986.
59. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). This was the first use of this rationale by a majority
of the Court; however, a concurring opinion written by Justice Powell a year prior to
Cardwell stated that the search of an automobile is "far less intrusive" than that of a
building. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973).
60. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590. As to Fourth Amendment searches in general, the
Court has held that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
61. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 587-88. The defendant had submitted to a police
request to appear at the police station. Id. at 587.
62. Id. at 593.
63. Id. at 591. The search consisted of an examination of the car's tire tread and
a taking of paint scrapings. Id. The police were investigating a murder that involved
contact between two vehicles-one belonging to the victim, the other attributed to the
suspect. Id. at 586.
[Vol. 57
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serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects."" Taking
into consideration the limited nature of the search and the place from where
the car was removed, the Court held that the warrantless search was not
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 65 The Court noted that the issue
here was distinct from cases involving the search of a car's interior.
66
In United States v. Chadwick,67 the Court delineated the rationales of the
automobile warrant exception when it refused to expand the exception to
include movable containers.68 In Chadwick, federal agents had probable
cause to believe a footlocker contained narcotics. 69  The footlocker was
placed in the trunk of defendant's car, and the agents arrested defendant
Chadwick.7' A warrantless search of the footlocker was conducted at the
federal building an hour and a half later.7 ' The search revealed large
amounts of marijuana.72
Indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for
conspiracy, 73 the defendants successfully moved for suppression of the
marijuana found in the footlocker. 74 The Court of Appeal -for the First
Circuit affirmed the suppression.75 The appellate court acknowledged that
the exigency due to the movability rationale logically encompassed a portable
container, yet declined to broaden the exception without explicit justification
from the Supreme Court.
76
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government petitioned the Court to
expand the warrant exception to include containers such as the footlocker.77
The Court responded: "The answer lies in the diminished expectations of
64. Id. at 590.
65. Id. at 592.
66. Id. at 592 n.8.
67. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
68. Id. at 12.
69. The probable cause was based on several factors: The footlocker was leaking
talcum powder, a substance often used to conceal the smell of narcotics; the footlocker
was unusually heavy; and a police dog trained to detect narcotics had indicated that
the footlocker contained a controlled substance. Id. at 3, 4.
70. Id. at 4. Two people assisting Chadwick with the footlocker were also
arrested. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Possession of marihuana with intent to distribute is in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1988). The conspiracy count was a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988).
74. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 5.
75. United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 782 (1st Cir. 1976).
76. Id. at 781.
77. Id. at 11-12.
1992]
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privacy which surrounds the automobile .... The factors which diminish the
privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to the [defendants'] footlock-
er."
78
The Court further explained that the footlocker's mobility does not
provide justification for expansion of the warrant exception under the exigency
rationale. Consequently, because the automobile exception was inapplica-
ble, and expansion of the exception was unjustified, the warrantless search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.80
In Arkansas v. Sanders, l the Court held that where police have
probable cause to believe a suitcase contains contraband, 2 a warrantless
search of the suitcase, when found in the trunk of a taxi stopped on a public
road, does not fall within the automobile warrant exception.83 The Court
framed the issue here as "whether the warrantless search of respondent's
suitcase falls on the Chadwick or the Chambers-Carroll side of the Fourth
Amendment line."84 If the search is governed by Chadwick, the police had
the right to seize the luggage, but not to search it prior to obtaining a
warrant.85 If the search is viewed simply as an automobile search, however,
then it is governed by Carroll and Chambers, which permit such warrantless
searches.'
In determining what type of search was involved, the Court evaluated the
facts under both rationalesY As to the exigency rationale, the Court ruled
78. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at. 12-13.
79. Id. at 13.
80. Id. at 15-16.
81. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
82. Id. at 761. Probable cause was based on a series of events. In April of 1976,
a reliable informant told Little Rock, Arkansas police officers that Lonnie James
Sanders was to arrive at the city's airport that afternoon, and that he would be carrying
a green suitcase containing marijuana. Id. at 755. Using information provided by the
informant, the officers located Sanders. Id. The officers observed Sanders meet a man
later identified as David Rambo, and then pick up a green suitcase from the baggage
claim. Id. Sanders gave the suitcase to Rambo, and then went to a taxi. Id. Rambo
joined Sanders a few minutes later, after depositing the suitcase in the trunk of the
taxi. Id.
83. Id. at 763.
84. Id. at 757. Sanders acknowledged that the police acted within the confines
of the Fourth Amendment when they stopped the taxi and seized the suitcase, Id. at
761-62. This apparently includes the defendant's stipulation that the officers had
probable cause; therefore, under Chambers these acts were constitutional.
85. Id. at 762.
86. Id. at 761-62. See supra notes 29-49 accompanying text.
87. 1d. at 763-65.
(Vol. 57
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/14
'AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION"
that the degree of exigency must be evaluated immediately prior to the
search.' In the facts before the Court here, the suitcase had no mobility
after the taxi had been stopped, therefore, no exigency existed, and the
rationale is inapplicable.8 9
As to the privacy rationale, the Court noted that a suitcase "serve[s] as
a repository for personal items" and that such a purpose is not altered by
placement of the suitcase into an automobile.90 Consequently, the privacy
expectations held in a suitcase placed in an automobile do not parallel the
privacy expectations held in an automobile. 9' The State's interpretation of
the automobile warrant exception (as encompassing a personal container found
in an automobile) was found to lack justification under both rationales. 92
Consequently, because the automobile exception was inapplicable, the
warrantless search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
In United States v. Ross, 93 the Court held that the permissible scope of
an automobile search under the warrant requirement exception is identical to
the scope authorized by a warrant, had one been obtained.94 In Ross, police
had probable cause to search defendant's entire automobile. 95 A search of
the automobile's trunk, and of a brown paper bag found therein, revealed
88. Id. at 763.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 764. The Court noted that not all containers found in automobiles "will
deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 764 n.13. Those that
convey their contents by way of the container itself hold no privacy expectation. Id.
91. Id. at 764-65.
92. Id. at 765.
93. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
94. Id. at 825. This issue had been addressed the previous term in Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). The parties in Robbins, however, did not adequately
address the issue. Id. at 817. Additionally, Robbins did not produce a majority
opinion. Id. at 815. Therefore, Ross was the first definitive word from the Court on
this issue. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.
95. Id. at 817. Probable cause to search arose from the following series of events.
In November of 1978, an informant contacted Detective Marcum of the District of
Columbia Police Department and told him that someone known as "Bandit" had been
selling narcotics out of the trunk of his automobile. Id. at 800. Marcum and two
other officers drove to the location provided by the informant, and eventually found
the car described by the informant. Id. Driving the car was Albert Ross, who police
had learned through a computer check was the registered owner of the car and used
the alias "Bandit." Id. The officers stopped the car, asked Ross to get out, and
searched him. Id. at 801. Meanwhile, one of the officers found a bullet on the front
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contraband.96 Ross was charged and convicted of possession of heroin with
intent to distribute.97 After Ross' conviction was reversed on appeal,98 the
Supreme Court granted the government's petition for certiorari. 99
The Court first pointed out that in both Chadwick and Sanders, the
officers did not have probable cause to search the vehicle involved.' In
both cases, probable cause existed only for the container at issue.' The
Court then framed the issue in Ross as distinct from Sanders and
Chadwick.'" That is, when officers have probable cause to search the entire
vehicle, may that search invade closed containers inside the vehicle?
10 3
After tracing the history of the automobile warrant exception,'1" the
Court concluded that the scope of a search under the exception is identical to
the scope of a warrant authorized search.'05 When a valid warrant has been
obtained, it is permissible to search anywhere the object of the search may be
found.' 06 Therefore, the Court reasoned, officers acting under the automo-
bile warrant exception may search anywhere in the vehicle that the object of
the search may be found, regardless of whether additional entry into containers
within the automobile is required. 7
The Court pointed out that Sanders and Chadwick dealt only with
circumstances involving probable cause to search a container in a car, whereas
Ross dealt only with circumstances involving probable cause to search the car
itself.'08 Therefore, the constitutional status of containers in automobiles for
which the police lack probable cause to search was unaffected by Ross.1°9
96. Id.
97. Id. Possession of heroin with intent to distribute is in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) (1988).
98. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
99. 454 U.S. 891 (1981).
100. Ross, 456 U.S. at 814.
101. Id. See supra notes 69 & 82 and accompanying text.
102. Ross, 456 U.S. at 817.
103. Id. at 817.
104. Id. at 804-20. The Court seemed to place great weight in the fact that the
case creating the exception, Carroll v. United States, involved the highly intrusive act
of ripping open a car seat to find the contraband. Id. at 804-05.
105. Id. at 823.
106. Id. at 820-21.
107. Id. at 825.
108. Id. at 817.
109. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1987, 1988, 1998.
[Vol. 57
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A. Justice Blackmun's Majority
Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter.' After
tracing the same line of cases discussed above, the Court stated the rule as it
stood following Ross:"0 "[Iln a Ross situation [(probable cause to search
the car)], the police could conduct a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment without obtaining a warrant, whereas in a Sanders situation
[(probable cause existing only to search a container)], the police had to obtain
a warrant before they searched.""' The Court then framed the issue of
Acevedo as whether this distinction is supported by the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment."
The Court held that it is not."' In reaching this conclusion, the Court
asserted that the rule derived from the Sanders side of the formulation was
simply not working." The Court put forth three main arguments to support
this conclusion."
5
First, the Court argued that the Sanders rule does not protect privacy
interests, and is therefore an unjustified impediment of law enforcement." 6
The majority asserted that the Sanders rule actually causes unnecessary
privacy intrusions." 7 Starting with the premise that it is often unclear
whether probable cause exits to search the entire automobile, or merely to
search a container, the Court concluded that this ambiguity would lead to
greater privacy intrusions by the state.""
Justice Blackmun reasoned that police officers with probable cause only
as to a container will expand their search to the entire automobile "in order
to establish the general probable cause required by Ross.""9 This reasoning
apparently operates under the assumption that the officer will feel that an
expansion of the search will cause the search to be viewed as one in which
110. Id. at 1985-87.
111. Id. at 1987.
112. Id. at 1988. The Court stated: "[W]hether the Fourth Amendment requires
the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because
they lack probable cause to search the entire car." Id.
113. Id. at 1988.
114. Id. at 1988-91.
115. Id.
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probable cause existed to the entire automobile. 120 If the officer is success-
ful in causing this to occur, then the search is interpreted under Ross and the
warrantless entry into containers is constitutional.2  Thus, a rule is
promulgated "that requires law enforcement officers to conduct a more
intrusive search in order to justify a less intrusive one."'12  The Court did
not wish to promulgate such a rule.'23
In addition, the Court determined that any privacy interests protected by
Sanders are slight.124 The Court provided three rationales for determining
that Sanders failed to protect privacy interests: (1) Because the container may
be seized and then opened upon issuance of a warrant, the container will
usually be opened anyway, consequently, no privacy interest is protected; (2)
Police can often search containers as incident to a lawful arrest, therefore, in
such a situation, there is no privacy interest protected; and (3) The opening of
a container is less of a privacy invasion than that perpetrated in Carroll v.
United States, where the Court, in creating the automobile warrant exception,
found that warrantless intrusion to be reasonable."2
Second, the Court argued that the prevailing rule had only served to
confuse the courts.126 The Court cited its frequent return to this issue to
illustrate the constant need for clarification due to confusion in lower
courts. 27 Critical commentaries were cited for their position that this is an
unsettled and ambiguous area of law. 28 In addition, the majority asserted
that the Chadwick-Sanders line has resulted in the confusing anomaly "that the
more likely the police are to discover drugs in a container, the less authority
they have to search it."
129
120. The Court uses the following language: "If the police know that they may
open a bag only if they are actually searching the entire car, they may search more
extensively .... Id.
121. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
122. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989. Justice Blackmun pointed to United States v.
Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985), where the Court ruled that although the warrantless search
was limited to containers, the search was justified under Ross because the officers had
probable cause as to the entire vehicle and therefore could have searched the entire
vehicle had they desired. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1988-89. This directly contradicts
Justice Blackmun's fear of expanded searches to justify limited searches. See id. at
2001 n.9.




127. Id. at 1989-91.
128. Id. at 1989.
129. Id. at 1990. This conclusion is apparently based on the hypothetical
situations of the police having probable cause to search the entire vehicle (presumably
[Vol. 57
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Third, the Court asserted that law enforcement has been confused because
when an automobile is involved, an officer with probable cause must first
decide which rule applies before he can proceed with a search. 130 The Court
felt that such a rule did not provide the kind of clear guidance to law
enforcement that sound policy demands. 3
The Court then proceeded to set forth the new rule: "The police may
search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable
cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." 132 The Court stated
that this rule does not expand Carroll, but merely determines that Carroll is
applicable to all automobile searches.
133
B. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia joined in the judgment of the Court, but not in its
opinion. 34  He agreed with the dissent that the result reached by the
majority was anomalous, 135 yet felt the Court was at least moving in the
correct direction. 36
For Scalia, the key to the issue was that the Fourth Amendment did not
proscribe warrantless searches, but instead prohibits unreasonable search-
es. 137  He acknowledged that it is conceivable that the reasonableness
requirement does mandate issuance of a warrant prior to a search. 38 Justice
Scalia, however, viewed the Court's present stance on the Fourth Amendment
as a mass of inconsistencies caused by a general warrant requirement "so
riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable." 39
with little likelihood that aparticular container will possess drugs). In that situation
they may search the container. Yet if the police have probable cause to search a
particular container (and presumably not the entire vehicle), then they may not search
the container. See id. at 2000.
130. Id. at 1989-90.
131. Id. at 1990.
132. Id. at 1991.
133. Id. at 1991.
134. Id. at 1992.
135. Specifically, Justice Scalia felt "that it is anomalous for a briefcase to be
protected by the 'general requirement' of a prior warrant when it is being carried along
the street, but for that same briefcase to become unprotected as soon as it is carried
into an automobile." Id.
136. Id.
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Therefore, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court must return to the basic
reasonableness requirement when evaluating Fourth Amendment searches.
1 40
Under this analysis, Justice Scalia would hold that when an officer has
probable cause to believe that a container located outside of a privately owned
building "contains contraband, and when it in fact does contain contraband,
[it] is not one of those Fourth Amendment searches whose reasonableness
depends on a warrant.', 141 Accordingly, the search in Acevedo was reason-
able, and the California Court of Appeal should be reversed.142
C. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall and in part by Justice White,
dissented.143  Justice Stevens prefaced his dissent by asserting that the
warrant requirement is well-grounded both in this country's history, and in
"sound policy judgment."' 44 He then traced the same cases that the majority
and this Note analyze.145 From this foundation, Justice Stevens concluded
that
[The Court] recognized in Ross that Chadwick and Sanders had not created
a special rule for container searches, but rather had merely applied the
cardinal principle that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless
justified by an exception to the general rule. Ross dealt with the scope of
the automobile exception; Chadwick and Sanders were cases in which the
exception simply did not apply. 46
With this point established, Justice Stevens proceeded to attack the
majority's reasoning. First, Justice Stevens asserted that there has been no
"confusion" in this area of the law.' 47 In support, he cites four cases
(including the case at bar) decided by the Court since Ross, and concluded
that each "were perfectly straightforward ... .""' The majority, however,
140. Id. at 1993.
141. Id. at 1994.
142. Id.
143. Justice White wrote a separate dissent: "Agreeing as I do with most of
Justice Stevens opinion and with the result he reaches, I dissent and would affirm the
judgment below." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1995-98.
146. Id. at 1998 (interior citations omitted).
147. Id. at 1998.
148. Id. at 1999. The four cases discussed by Justice Stevens, and the
propositions he draws from them are as follows: Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 471 U.S.
146 (1985) (probable cause only as to container in car, container may be seized, but
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addressed these cases and found that each case, in some fashion, demonstrated
that this is a confused area of law.'49
Justice Stevens also addressed the majority's claim that the prior cases
have resulted in an anomaly.' Justice Stevens asserted that, even if such
an anomaly can be contrived,' 1 the majority has simply substituted one
paradox for another."5 He pointed out that under the majority's ruling, a
briefcase that the police have probable cause to search is transformed from
that which is not subject to a warrantless search, to that which is, simply by
its insertion into an automobile.
5 3
Second, Justice Stevens asserted that the prior cases have in fact afforded
protection of privacy interests. 4 He noted that the majority's concern for
expanded searches to justify limited searches'55 necessarily contemplated the
evaluation of probable cause based not on the officer's knowledge at the
search's inception, but on what the scope of the search later becomes. 6 As
Justice Stevens pointed out, this type of "post hoc justification" cannot be used
to establish the existence of probable cause.
5 7
Justice Stevens also attacked the majority's use of the search incident to
arrest warrant requirement exception as justification for expansion of the
automobile warrant requirement exception. 5 He noted that in the case
cited by the majority,5 9 the justification for the warrantless search was
based on a threat to the arresting officer's safety, not on the automobile
not searched prior to obtaining warrant); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
(detention of luggage unreasonable due to length of time detained; Ross did not modify
Sanders); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); see supra note 122; People v.
Acevedo, 365 Cal. Rpt. 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (California court of appeal ruled that
probable cause as to bag in car means bag can be seized, but not searched without
warrant).
149. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1988-89, 1990.
150. Id. at 2000. See id. at 1900; see also supra note 129 and accompanying text.
151. Justice Stevens believes the majority's logic is based on the "flawed premise
that the degree to which the police are likely to discover contraband is correlated with
their authority to search without a warrant." Id. at 2000 (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 2000-01.
153. Id. at 2001. See id. at 1992.
154. Id. at 2001.
155. Id. at 1989. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 2001. See id. at 1999 n.9.
157. Id.
158. Id. See id. at 1989; see also supra note 125 and accompanying text.
159. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
1992]
15
Soden: Soden: Expansion of the Automobile Exception
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
exception." °  Consequently, Justice Stevens asserted, such a case is
inapplicable to the case at bar.161
Third, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's contention that prior cases
have impeded law enforcement. 162 After stating that the majority provided
no authority for its conclusion, he contended that even if an impediment is
created, such is the case for all individual rights protected by the Bill of
Rights.1 6
3
The dissent closes by asserting that the true significance of the majority's
ruling is not found in the particular result reached on these facts, but is in the
"Court's willingness to inflict it without even a colorable basis for its rejection
of prior law."' 6'
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision provides a bright-line rule: Probable cause to search
a container, in addition to its location within an automobile, is justification for
a warrantless search of the container. Setting forth clear guidelines aides
effective law enforcement. 65 The Court's method of establishing this rule,
however, led the Court to contradict much of the policy and rationale
supporting the automobile exception and Fourth Amendment law in general.
As mentioned above, the Sanders and Chadwick decisions had nothing
to do with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, aside from the
fact that the situations presented in them were held to be outside the realm of
the automobile exception. 16 In Acevedo, as in Sanders and Chadwick, the
connection between the automobile involved and the container was largely
coincidental. 67  Unlike the Sanders and Chadwick Courts though, the
Acevedo Court chose to give significance to this coincidence.
160. Id. at 460-61; Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 2001.
161. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 2001.
162. Id. at 2001-02.
163. Id. at 2002-03.
164. Id. at 2003.
165. The Court has acknowledged the benefit of "clear and unequivocal"
guidelines for law enforcement in reference to Fifth and Sixth Amendment law. See
Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 490 (1990) (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486
U.S. 675, 682 (1988)). The Acevedo majority quotes this language prior to asserting
that the Chadwick-Sanders rule is the "antithesis" of such a policy. Acevedo, 111 S.
Ct. at 1990.
166. See supra notes 68,& 83 and accompanying text; see alsoAcevedo, 111 S.
Ct. at 1988.
167. See supra notes 17-19, 69-70, 83 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, Acevedo, unlike its predecessors in this area of law, is
exclusively neither a container case nor an automobile case. It is both. In
meshing these previously separated concepts, the Court did more than overrule
the Chadwick-Sanders rule,'68 it ignored the two rationales that provided the
foundation for the automobile warrant exception.
A. The Exigency Rationale
Since 1925, the Court has recognized the exigency rationale as providing
the original justification for the automobile warrant exception.169  In
Acevedo, however, the Court expanded the automobile exception with no
justification from the exigency rationale. To follow the majority's bypass of
the exigency rationale, one must first retreat to the Ross decision.
The Ross Court laid the foundation for this expansion by placing
containers within the realm of the automobile exception. 170  Because the
Court reached this conclusion by equating the automobile exception with a
search under a valid warrant, there was no need to differentiate between the
automobile and the containers within the automobile.'17 Consequently, the
search of the container could logically be seen as encompassed by the
exigency implicit in an automobile. The Acevedo Court, however, pointed to
this consequence of a Ross search as justification for a warrantless search of
an automobile that police do not have probable cause to search-a situation
not applicable to the Ross decision. 72
The Acevedo Court noted "this Court in Ross took the- critical step of
saying that closed containers in cars could be searched without a warrant
because of their presence within the automobile."' 73  The Court then
discarded as unworkable the distinction between probable cause to search a
car and probable cause to search a container in a car. 74 With this distinc-
tion brushed aside, the Ross holding now becomes the justification for the
Acevedo search. 75
168. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991.
169. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153; Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51; Coolidge, 403 U.S.
at 462; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13; Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763; Ross, 456 U.S. at 805-07.
See also supra notes 39, 47, 56-57, 79, 87-88 and accompanying text.
170. Ross, 456 U.S. at 823-24.
171. Id. at 824.
172. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
173. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1987.
174. Id. at 1988.
175. Id. at 1991.
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Lost in the Court's abandonment of this critical distinction was any
justification for an Acevedo search under the exigency rationale.'7 6 Still, the
Court purported to hold in Acevedo that Carroll, the origin of the exigency
rationale, "provid[es] one rule to govern all automobile searches. '" 77
Basically, the Court extracted the "rules" it liked from Ross and Carroll while
conveniently leaving behind the justification for those rules.
B. The Privacy Rationale
Since the 1974 Cardwell decision, the Court has focused much of the
reasoning of the automobile warrant exception cases on the rationale that
persons have a "lesser" expectation of privacy in cars. 78 Until Ross, the
Court consistently held that the lowered expectation of privacy found in the
automobile is not applicable to movable containers.179 Even the Ross court
distinguished, and thus left undisturbed, the Chadwick-Sanders rule applicable
to situations where the police have probable cause limited to the search of a
container.'8°
The Acevedo Court, however, placed the Chadwick-Sanders situation of
Acevedo within the realm of the automobile exception.' 8 This automatically
justifies an Acevedo search under this rationale because the automobile
exception, prior to this expansion, is clearly supported by the "lesser" privacy
expectation rationale. However, because this rationale for the automobile
exception is based, coincidentally enough, on the automobile, it offers no
justification for a rule that in reality involves the privacy expectation one
holds in a container.'8
With no support to be found in the two rationales that shaped every prior
case in this area of Fourth Amendment law, the majority turned to policy
arguments to justify its conclusion.
176. The officers clearly had the right to seize the bag in Acevedo, therefore, no
exigency existed.
177. Id. at 1991.
178. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590; See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13; Sanders, 442
U.S. at 764-65; Ross, 456 U.S. at 823. See also supra notes 60, 64, 78-79, 90-91 and
accompanying text.
179. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13; Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65; see also
supra notes 78-79, 90-91 and accompanying text.
180. Ross, 456 U.S. at 817.
181. See supra notes 171 & 178 and accompanying text.
182. It could be argued that, more accurately, Acevedo involves the privacy
expectation one holds in a container located in an automobile, but to require such a
specification would be to assert that one's privacy expectation in a container changes
when it is placed in a car-an assertion unsupported by logic or precedent.
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C. Majority's Policy Arguments
The Acevedo Court believed the restriction on the state due to the
Chadwick-Sanders rulings was unjustified because it was providing "minimal"
protection of privacy while burdening law enforcement.1 8 3  The Court
contended law enforcement will be impeded because police officers will
become confused during vehicle searches."s  The Court supported the
assertion that privacy protection has been minimal under the following three
theories.
In the first, the majority correctly stated that prior to this case a container
with which officers possess probable cause to search may be seized but not
opened.'8a These cases "routinely" result in the issuance of a warrant and
the independent opening. 1 6 Consequently, the Court asserted, there is no
protection of privacy interests.8 7 Basically, the Court stated that because
officers usually only seize containers with probable cause, they should be
allowed to search them also.
This circumvention of a neutral magistrate based on the probability of a
correct end result is clearly not what the Court had in mind when it held that
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."'" The probability of constitutionality is not such an exception.
Further, the majority's reliance on the assumption that law enforcement
officers will usually have probable cause in an Acevedo situation is in direct
conflict with controlling Fourth Amendment precedent. In the often cited
Johnson v. United States,"8 9 Justice Jackson held:
183. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989.
184. Id. at 1989-90. The Court states: "For example, when an officer, who has
developed probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains drugs, begins to search the
vehicle and immediately discovers a closed container, which rule applies?" Id.
(emphasis added) Obviously, because the officer has probable cause to search the
vehicle, Ross applies, and the entire automobile may be searched as if a warrant had
been obtained. Ross, 456 U.S. at 823-24.
185. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. See supra note 28.
189. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). This portion of Johnson was cited by the dissent in
Acevedo. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1995. This quote has been set forth as the reason for
the warrant requirement in a leading treatise. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, CHRISTO-
PHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROcEDURE, AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 144
(2d ed. 1986) (unaltered by 1990 supplement). Justice Powell, writing for a
unanimous Court, referred to the quote as the "classic statement" of Fourth Amend-
1992]
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The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is often not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of fettering out crime. 190
Zealous Justices might well be grouped with "zealous officers" as those not
grasping the point of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the Court asserts that because officers may often search a
container located in a car incident to an arrest, there is minimal protection of
privacy by the Sanders rule.'91 As the dissent pointed out, the justification
for warrantless searches incident to arrest stems from the policy that officers
must be allowed to secure the immediate environment for their own safe-
ty.-' 92 When applicable, this is clearly a sound justification for an exception
to the warrant requirement. The assertion, however, that the "subject to arrest"
exception provides a basis for expansion of the automobile exception,
regardless of whether the officer is in jeopardy, is not consistent with the
policies behind either exception.
If the Court's point is that these searches will occur under the arrest
exception anyway and therefore there is no privacy interest protected, then
there is no need to overrule Sanders, for the arrest exception must already
encompass most Sanders situations. But that is not the case because there are
endless situations imaginable where the arrest exception will not apply, and
Sanders would have controlled and offered significant protection of privacy.
Acevedo is one such situation.193
Third, the Court compared the privacy violation in Carroll with that of
Acevedo and held that "[i]f destroying the interior of an automobile is not
unreasonable, we cannot conclude that looking inside a closed container
is."' 94 This comparison does not logically support the conclusion that the
Chadwick-Sanders rule afforded "minimal" protection of privacy. Plainly
stated, the contention is this: Because an automobile may be searched
extensively under Carroll, the separate Chadwick-Sanders rule prohibiting the
search of containers offers "minimal" privacy protection. The Chadwick-
ment policy. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975).
190. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
191. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989.
192. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61; see also supra notes 161-62 and accompany-
ing text.
193. The arrest exception to the warrant requirement would logically never be
applicable anytime the search of an automobile's trunk is involved.
194. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989.
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Sanders rule offers privacy protection to containers-not to the upholstering
of automobiles. Yet the Court suggests that because it does not offer such
protection, it should be struck down as ineffective. 9" It simply does not
follow that the allowable scope of an automobile search highlights minimal
privacy protection afforded by a rule prohibiting the search of containers.
V. CONCLUSION
Apparently, the Acevedo Court wanted to reach the result that the
warrantless search of a properly seized container located in an automobile is
constitutional. It did accomplish this; however, it should have done so
directly. Instead, the Court broadens a previously "well-delineated" exception
to the warrant requirement with no justification from the two rationales
supporting that exception. In disregarding these rationales the Court has
destroyed the foundation on which this area of Fourth Amendment law was
built. Beyond the complaint that the Court rejected precedent "without even
a colorable basis"' 96 for doing so, there is the realization that the Court now
has no guidance for the future in this area of law.
The Court would have reached a better result if it had left the inapplica-
ble automobile exception out of this decision and dealt with the matter before
it-the constitutionality of the warrantless search of a container subject to a
valid seizure. The Court might have reached the same result while setting
forth clear law for the future and leaving the automobile exception intact.
STEVEN D. SODEN
195. Id. at 1989.
196. Id. at 2003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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